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Advocacy in the Age of Authoritarianism: Adjustments of all
Sorts in Egypt
Mariz Tadros
Summary
This paper examines how advocacy, a highly political concept became a 
depoliticised technocratic buzzword for many donors, international and local
NGOs. The focus of the paper is on the top-down introduction of advocacy in the
Egyptian context in the 1990s as part of the bid to promote democratisation in the
Arab world. It argues that in authoritarian contexts, participatory advocacy is 
inimical to the inhibitive policy environment and the nature of the political culture in
place.
The paper relies on a series of case studies involving donor-state-civil society
interfaces in supporting advocacy. It draws in particular on the largest funding
scheme to promote advocacy in the country, a USAID initiative involving a 
consortium of partners. It tracks the transformations that took place in order to
convert advocacy into a ‘government-friendly’ form of engagement and reflects on
the inherent tensions for donors backing a politicised form of development that
clashes with their foreign policy.
The paper argues that often advocacy NGOs are disembedded from the wider
context due to a focus on the policy influence arena where they are expected to
elicit change. Insufficient incentives to mobilise a constituency as well as a 
politically restrictive environment means that sometimes advocacy oriented 
initiatives or organisations ignore prompts from citizen groups engaged in 
contentious politics. Many advocacy NGOs engage in an elite way that impacts
negatively on policies and on downward accountability towards a weak or non-
existent constituency. This not only has implications for their positionality in their
contexts but also on the nature of policy demands made as well.
Keywords: advocacy; authoritarianism; democratisation; Egypt; citizen 
participation; civil society.
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Advocacy is in vogue in many development circles today. Advocacy like other 
concepts diffusing mainstream development has become a buzzword, its meaning
re-invented and its purpose redefined by donors, international and local NGOs
alike. Donors’ interest in funding advocacy seems to have increased in contexts of
supporting good governance and democratisation programmes. This paper 
examines the US government’s support for introducing advocacy among Egyptian
NGOs as part of the wider programme of democracy promotion via strengthening
civil society. It sheds light on the tensions in donor support for a politicised form of
development that clashes with their foreign policy. Support for advocacy was 
highly elusive when it was subject to the many ebbs and flows in US foreign policy
direction. The paper argues that more participatory oriented forms of advocacy
are incompatible with authoritarian contexts where political openings are far and
few. US-supported advocacy was top-down, partly because of the inhibitive policy
environment and partly because of the nature of the political culture in which the
ideas are being diffused. The outcome was a support for NGO engagement in
advocacy that was depoliticised and made compatible with different agendas:
donors who want to support government-friendly advocacy while appearing to
strengthen civil society’s efforts in political reforms and recipients of donor funding
who wish to dip into the pool of advocacy funding without risking political suicide.
In the end, donor-funded advocacy was about distributing vitamin pills to anaemic
women and developing a successful strategy for marketing mushrooms. Yet the
impact of donor supported top down advocacy was not only that it failed to contest
authoritarian rule but that it actually entrenched existing power hierarchies.
Engaging in an elitist policy process further strengthened the push to make 
advocacy led by professional experts with strong political connections. Donors’
evaluation of advocacy in terms of attempts to influence policy further exacerbated
the tendency for some NGOs to engage in campaigns without the participation of
those affected by the issue campaigned for, or without a constituency altogether.
In this context, donor policy represented a further disincentive to advocacy NGOs
to engage in more participatory forms of social action. 
The first part of the paper discusses the inherent conceptual tensions in the 
people-based frameworks of advocacy and its more professionalised usage in
development circles. The section that follows discusses the regional and Egyptian
context in which advocacy was exported as well as its susceptibility to the shifts in
the US administration’s foreign policy. It describes ways in which neither the 
political culture nor the policy environment were conducive towards overcoming
the elitist, depoliticised nature of advocacy. In section three, a case study of the
IDS WORKING PAPER 337
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largest funding scheme to promote advocacy in Egypt is analysed, shedding light
on how the original version of the programme was watered down voluntarily,
transforming it into a completely different initiative with a very different focus. The
outcome, it is argued is funding a fuzzy, lukewarm government friendly kind of
advocacy that still failed to win the approval of all sections of the government. Yet
it is not only donors who have re-invented people’s advocacy, in section four,
international and local organisations’ dilution and depoliticisation of the term is 
discussed at length. In section five, the paper argues that advocacy NGOs are
disembedded from the wider context and fail to respond to social and political 
signals from citizen groups that are engaged in contentious politics. Further, it
describes ways in which the elitist nature of many advocacy NGOs’ engagements
has negatively impacted on their choice of policy demand as well as on downward
accountability towards a weak or non-existent constituency – a dilemma, that in
this context, was only made more acute by donor policies. 
The paper draws on an analysis of a series of advocacy campaigns pursued in
Egypt since the late 1990s for which the author was personally involved or
through the close engagement of informants. The main case study, of the USAID
funded NGO Service Center draws on a variety of sources. The main source of
information were senior officers working in the Center with whom the author had
close association and ties. Interviews with USAID officers, who wished to remain
anonymous, provided some critical background information and context, which
were then complemented with a mid-term evaluation report on the initiative 
undertaken for USAID. The paper also draws on an analysis of the political and
social dynamics influencing state-civil society relations in Egypt, in particular in the
past decade. 
1 Professionalising people’s 
advocacy
The use of the word advocacy in the realm of social activism dates back to the
late 1980s, but gained momentum in the 1990s when social movements and more
radical NGOs sought to directly contest policies, laws, practices and policymaking
processes. ‘Participatory’, ‘citizenship’, ‘people’s’ advocacy came to the fore.
Participatory Advocacy, ‘extends the boundaries of public decision-making by
engaging civil society groups in policy debates. It is founded on the belief that
democratic governance is the task of citizens as well as governments. This type of
advocacy aims to expand public space and citizenship’ (VeneKlasen and Miller
2002: 28). Advocacy, according to Miller is defined with citizens at its core
‘Citizen-centered advocacy is an organized political process that involves the
coordinated efforts of civil society to change policies, practices, ideas and values
that perpetuate inequality and exclusion (VeneKlasen and Miller 2002: 28). Public
advocacy is similar but the core difference is in its focus on marginalised groups,
rather than citizens in general: ‘public advocacy is a set of deliberate actions
designed to influence public policies or public attitudes in order to empower the
marginalized’ (Samuel 2007: 616). Despite the nuanced differences between
them, the above framings have much in common; first, the centrality of 
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participation (that people should define the issue or cause for advocacy and they
should directly be engaged in the process of seeking change); second, the 
political nature of contestation, which involved challenging, on one level or 
another, power relations; third, they were all in some way associated with the
quest for social justice and social movements; fourth, they described very context
specific experiences and forms of people-state engagements (Clark et al. 2002;
Cohen et al. 2001: 35).
By the late 1990s, advocacy became a buzzword among donors, international and
local NGOs (Cornwall 2007: 476). Advocacy, like other buzzwords, is ‘densely
populated with ideological projects and positions’ (Cornwall 2007: 478). The twin
ideological projects which characterised the period in which advocacy became
popular was good governance and the promotion of democratisation in the South.
Advocacy (in a different form) was compatible with both, because in both 
paradigms, civil society was construed to play a key role in keeping a check on
the government, holding it accountable and monitoring its performance. Advocacy
was also in theory political, at a time when there was a shift towards recognising
the political face of development. As Coates and David point out there was
increased shift to advocacy as NGOs and many donors came to ‘recognize that
several decades of aid projects, even those using improved methodologies for
intervention, are neither addressing the determinants of poverty nor alleviating its
symptoms on a sufficient scale’ (2002: 530). Since policy reform is a very broad
arena of engagement, advocacy did not have to be antithetical to neoliberal 
policies, to the contrary, advocacy could be used as an instrument to endorse
more open-market reforms in the South by private sector supporters (see for
example the Middle East Partnership Initiative in the next section). 
The transformation of advocacy into a buzzword by donors meant that the word
still conjured positive connotations of activism, without necessarily retaining its
participatory basis or its politically radical nature. In contexts where NGOs are 
elitist, advocacy could be a set of activities (principally organising campaigns)
involving NGO advocates seeking policy change on behalf of a constituency, and
in some cases, without a constituency altogether. By focusing on the extent of
which advocacy was successful in changing policy, it was possible for donors and
NGOs alike to justify its transformation into an activity best performed by experts
(especially if it involved seeking legislative change, in which case lawyers and
activists with a background in human rights frameworks would be considered
those best positioned to engage in advocacy).
The professionalisation of advocacy was also important in appropriating a 
universal quality to it. Advocacy, in its earlier conceptualisations, was very much
about how activists responded to historical and political conjectures in people-
state relations. By professionalising advocacy, it is then possible to develop a set
of blueprints describing the technical steps involved in doing advocacy. By 
disengaging with the political nuances and contexts in which advocacy is 
practiced, advocacy as adopted by donors, becomes very much like other 
buzzwords which reflect ‘the one-size-fits-all development recipes stripped of any
engagement with context or culture, politics, power or difference’ (Cornwall 2007:
1058). The outcome is that advocacy rather than being an element reflecting a
particular approach to eliciting change was hijacked and trivialised into ‘quick-fix
tools for scaling up impacts’ (Samuel undated).
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Professionalising and universalising advocacy was also accompanied by its
depoliticisation. The idea that advocacy is about contesting the power of 
institutions and hierarchies posed a dilemma. On the one hand, advocacy 
provided an excellent opportunity to practically bring politics back into 
development, on the other, exporting a model which involved strengthening NGOs
able to contest authoritarian governments with which donors had geostrategic
partnerships. These tensions were particularly well exemplified in the case of US
promotion of democratisation in the Middle East, where advocacy promotion was
not necessarily always compatible with foreign policy goals. As shown in the next
section, the US administration was always cautious, even at the apex of its 
funding for advocacy in Egypt, to provide unilateral support for NGOs contesting
the government. Since ‘buzzwords shelter multiple agendas, providing room for
maneuver and contestation’ (Cornwall 2007: 474), it was possible to continue to
claim to be supporting advocacy while transforming its content into something less
political, less radical and more professional – certainly, more government-friendly.
The transformation of the meaning of advocacy meant that: ‘it is being widely and
broadly used to signify a sweep of practices ranging from public relations, market
research and report writing to lobbying, public interest litigations and civil 
disobedience ...’ (Samuel undated). Engagement in politically contentious activity
also proved problematic for international and local NGOs working in politically
repressive environments. Many worked in contexts where they were neither
afforded the freedom to build constituencies, engage in community mobilisation,
nor openly contest government policies. Yet advocacy was where the funding was
being directed, and consequently, it was also conveniently appropriated as a
buzzword ‘appropriated by urban and international elites and increasingly 
professionalized’ (Cornwall 2007: 476). 
2 The regional and Egyptian 
context: advocacy from above
Support for civil society in the Middle East by donors has always been subject to
the ebb and flow of foreign policy. Here, some of the highs and lows of civil 
society support at different phases of the US administration in the past decade are
highlighted with a view to exposing the wider political framework within which
funding for advocacy and civil society is mediated. 
Advocacy was first exported to Egypt via USAID in the late 1990s as part of their
promotion of good governance and democracy. First introduced under the Clinton
administration, funding for civil society engagement in democracy promotion via
advocacy and other interventions was strengthened under the Bush administration
through increased allocation of funding for civil society, channeled through USAID.
In 2002, the Bush administration launched the Middle East Partnership Initiative,
located within the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs at the US Department of State.
MEPI signaled the US government’s commitment to endorse economic 
liberalisation and democratisation through direct engagement: half the projects
were run directly by civil society. MEPI had several aims: giving people a voice in
their future, supporting quality education, developing economic opportunity
(through the market), empowering women and increasing opportunities for youth.
Under giving people a voice in their future, MEPI set out ‘developing civil society
and reform advocacy to create public conversation, allowing democratic voices to
be heard in the political process’ as one of its four key areas.1 The launch of
MEPI meant that that funds available for ‘advocacy’ were greatly increased and
channels for their dissemination diversified. Egyptian NGOs were no longer 
confined to seeking funds through USAID, more funds were now administered by
the US embassy in Cairo and by the regional office in Tunisia. 
Yet the US government’s support for advocacy or any other initiative involving civil
society was always unpredictable, shaped predominantly by US foreign policy
concerns. Towards the end of the Bush administration, there was yet another
swing in US policy against civil society promotion. In Egypt, ‘After pushing fairly
assertively (and with some success) for reform in Egypt in 2003–2005, the United
States dropped the issue just as suddenly in 2006 because its priorities shifted
from transformational back to traditional diplomacy to contain regional crises’
(Dunne et al. 2007: 1). While funding for civil society promotion of democratisation
continued, there was strong evidence that the Bush administration’s political 
commitment towards pressing the Egyptian government for improved human
rights profile waned. 
In 2009, with the Obama government elected into office, there are few indicators
that the pendulum has swung back in favour of strengthening local groups and
organisations’ efforts to elicit political and social reform. In fact, the impression in
Cairo is that the Obama administration seemed to have abandoned democracy
promotion via civil society strengthening in the Middle East altogether.2 For 2009,
funding for democracy promotion in Egypt was slashed from $50 million to $20
million and much of the cut in funding targeted civil society organisations, in 
particular human rights groups for whom funding was dropped by about 70 per
cent. The State Department conceded to the Egyptian government’s demands not
to use economic aid to support civil society organisations it did not approve of.
Further, Democrats on the House Appropriations Committee inserted $260 million
in fresh security assistance for Egypt into a supplemental appropriations bill, along
with $50 million for border security. No conditions were attached.3 The move 
certainly placates the Mubarak regime, however, other critics of external funding
of civil society organisations certainly welcome the move.
The idea of internally promoting democracy via external funding has had its fair
share of criticisms in terms of it being a channel for lining the pockets of so-called
activists with minimal internal legitimacy and of supporting American right-wing
democracy organisations that again, have no grounding in national contexts
where they thrive. Nevertheless, a slash in funding also meant reduced funding
for organisations engaged in such activities as human rights monitoring and 
election monitoring for whom donor funding was critical for their survival. Yet the
11 
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1 The other three were improving elections, strengthening free media, promoting the rule of law.
2 Dunne, Washington Post, 17 August 2009.
3 Washington Post, 7 May 2009, editorial, ‘No Questions Asked’, p11.
inconsistency of US support for democracy, either politically or through funding
has obliterated the potential for any genuine strengthening non-governmental
organisations’ activism against authoritarian rule. The message that the US and
other donors have consistently sent out is that they are not prepared to undermine
strategic partnerships with governments in the bid to see through civil society
strengthening (Ottaway 2003; Hawthorne 2004; Carothers and Ottaway 2000,
2005).
It is in this highly volatile context that funding advocacy in Egypt must be 
understood – an instrument tied to foreign policy rather than a means through
which civil society can contest government. This paper examines US funding for
advocacy at a political moment in which promoting democracy was high on the
foreign policy agenda. Advocacy was introduced from above, in a top-down 
manner that never quite managed to find an indigenous grounding with potential
for widespread diffusion. 
2.1 Top-down indigenous advocacy?
Participatory forms of advocacy cannot genuinely take root in authoritarian
regimes. People’s advocacy or more participatory forms of advocacy are premised
on initiatives taking place in liberal democratic regimes or in countries undergoing
transitions to democracy. A number of assumptions or prerequisites are 
associated with the democratic or democratising contexts. First, a political culture
supportive (or at least not completely repressive) of NGOs playing an oppositional
role vis-à-vis the government. Second, the policy process is relatively open to 
citizen engagement. In most authoritarian regimes, the weakness of both these
elements inhibits indigenous-inspired forms of participatory advocacy.
The prevalence of liberal democracy or a country undergoing a shift towards
democratisation is fundamental, since it assumes a minimal level of political 
freedom is allowed. This seems to characterise the case studies documenting a
process of active citizen engagement with advocacy featuring in the literature.
John Samuel’s description of people’s advocacy in India is marked by the 
presence of a liberal democracy (undated). Valerie Miller’s description of 
advocacy initiatives in the Philippines, she notes, was only possible in the context
of a transition to formal democracy in the eighties which created a political 
opening for NGO activism (Miller 1994: 2). Blair concludes that the fact that
Indonesia lagged behind the Philippines by 15 years, has created an environment
in the latter that is more conducive to advocacy activities (Blair 2004: 84). The
country case studies of engaged advocacy in South Asia, Central America, East
Africa, Southeast Asia and North America explored by Clark et al. occur in 
contexts of relatively democratic or democratising countries (2002). Successful
advocacy campaigns in Mexico, Chile, India, Turkey, Morocco and Brazil explored
in another initiative also occurred ‘in countries that have undergone a process of
democratization, offering new opportunities for organized engagement by civil
society actors’ (Gaventa 2008).
In authoritarian regimes, there may be political moments offering an opportunity
for engagement in more participatory forms of advocacy, yet because they are
IDS WORKING PAPER 337
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momentary, often reflecting temporary government responsiveness to international
pressure, they are usually not sustained. In authoritarian contexts, the minimal
level of freedom required to mobilise citizens or establish constituencies is often
severely curbed. Even if the shackles to these freedoms were removed, the 
controls imposed by authoritarian regimes are so deep seated that it may take
time before a political culture more accommodating of civil society’s role in 
oppositional policies, policymaking processes and entrenched power bases 
develops.
2.2 Political culture
The way in which advocacy is practiced is intrinsically connected to the political
culture and political processes that characterise the system of governance in a
particular country context. In India for example, there was a historical 
development in the nature of government and the nature of citizen-government
engagement, which allowed for transformation of grassroots social action to one
that is amplified and channeled to the national level (Samuel undated). Yet in
Egypt, advocacy was introduced in a context of welfare pluralism but not genuine
political pluralism, thus the potential for service-providing NGOs to engage in
transformative social action was severely inhibited. In the 1990s advocacy was
imposed top-down upon civil society organisations most of whom were as far
removed as possible from politicised forms of social action.4 Fifty years of 
authoritarian rule inhibiting political activism in Egypt has meant that the majority
of the 20,000 existing CSOs firmly believe that their activities should be apolitical.
A significant proportion of the organisations working on a grassroots level believe
that their role is poverty alleviation through collection and disbursement of charity.
The minority of organisations engaged in human rights and other more politically
oriented activities work under the control and surveillance of the government. The
historical rupture with its liberal past in the period up to the 1940s has meant that
the prospects of reviving old forms of civil society engagement are virtually 
impossible (organisations were co-opted or liquidated in the 1950s). 
Forms of activism which can be described today as advocacy date as far back as
the nineteenth century when Egypt experienced the emergence and development
of local organisations in the late 1800s. NGOs lobbied for changes of policies on
regulation of civil life, challenged gender laws and policies, and called for reform
of the political system. There was no distinction in the work of associations
between political and non-political activism. Individuals working in charities could
be distributing food and blankets to the poor at one point, and at another, have
their halls open to a meeting for the nationalist (for example the nineteenth 
century renowned religious reformist and nationalist leader Muhammed Abdu, who
established one of the first Egyptian NGOs, the Islamic Charitable Association
which extended assistance to the poor).5 There was no contradiction in engaging
in service delivery and participating in the political life of the nation, all through the
IDS WORKING PAPER 337
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4 With the obvious exception of the Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamist movement with a wide network of 
social service provision that historically has not been consistently removed from politics.
same organisation and via the same individuals. The depoliticisation of civil 
society organisations and the inhibition of political space for civil society activism
occurred in the 1950s. The Nasserite government in Egypt and other nationalist
governments that came to power in the Middle East instated a set of inhibitive
restrictions on civil society as a whole. In Egypt for example, political parties were
abolished, the civil system of Endowments nationalised, censorship imposed on
the press, and severe restrictions placed on the religious institutions and NGOs.
The functions of supporting the marginalised and poor were transferred to the
newly established centralised government. Civil society organisations were
closed, co-opted and/or depoliticised in Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Iraq.
When in the 1970s, the centralised state model was replaced with a minimalist
one, and the government of Sadat embarked on an economic liberalisation plan,
commonly known as the Infitah. Since adopting economic liberalisation, the
Egyptian government has embraced welfare pluralism, but not political pluralism.
Welfare pluralism replaced the state welfare model institutionalised at the time of
Nasser, and thus, opened up the space for the non-profit and private sector
involvement. Yet in the light of the absence of political freedom, those providing
welfare could only do so on the pre-set apolitical terms. 
In response to the opening for NGO provision of services, there was a renewed
interest on the part of donors in supporting civil society, in particular the promotion
of development NGOs. The model promoted by foreign donors in the
1970s–1990s was more or less of depoliticised development. There was much
focus on instilling the principles of grassroots development which is responsive
and attuned to people’s needs and priorities. A new brand of civil society 
organisations began to emerge, NGDOs (non-governmental development 
organisations), that was instrumental in presenting a different model of work with
the poor in rural and urban areas. These organisations were mostly foreign-
funded and some grew to become intermediary organisations supporting local
grassroots associations as well. Like charities and other forms of non-
governmental organisations working in Egypt, they could claim that they were not
engaged in politics but in helping the marginalised and poor. Moreover, in the
1980s another type of association emerged which was openly political: human
rights organisations. While human rights activists professed engagement in 
support of human rights in a non-partisan framework, the fact that they felt 
comfortable in engaging in an area that was evidently political may be explained
by their backgrounds: many (although not all) were leftist activists for whom
activism through political parties was blocked due to government restrictions.
Human rights organisations, although established, directed and managed by local
citizens, also relied on foreign funding. It can be argued that local human rights
organisations were long engaged in advocacy since the 1990s. They used some
of the conventional tools of advocacy such as campaigning, lobbying, joining
international coalitions and networks and seeking to work with the press although
donors spoke about supporting human rights rather than advocacy. Human rights
IDS WORKING PAPER 337
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5 See for example the Complete Works of Muhammed Abdu, Dar el Shoruk publ. Cairo, (2006) (in 
Arabic).
organisations who had registered as non-profit civil companies rather than as non-
governmental organisations registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs because
of the infeasibility of engaging in work that is considered political, and 
consequently prohibited for NGOs. 
The spirit of depoliticisation of NGO activism that began in the 1950s was 
institutionalised through multiple channels: a highly restrictive NGO Law, the 
surveillance of the state security investigations apparatus, and a highly inhibitive
Ministry of Social Solidarity (previously named Ministry of Social Affairs) 
responsible for overseeing all aspects of NGO work. The current NGO Law like
that introduced in the 1960s, prohibits activities considered of a political nature.
Law 84 of 2000 empowers the Ministry of Social Solidarity to liquidate an NGO at
will (Article 42). It also allows the government to co-opt human rights 
organisations by penalising NGOs not registered with the Ministry – the penalty is
a maximum of six months in prison and/or a payment of LE 2000). HRS 
organisations, who were most likely to be affected by the existing law, criticised
the fact that permission must be obtained from the Minister of Social Solidarity
before receiving any foreign funds (Article 17). According to the NGO Law, the
Ministry retains the right to liquidate an NGO at will if it commits ‘a grave violation
against the law, public order or public morality’. This allows the ministry to broadly
interpret an act that contravenes public order or public morality to prohibit 
associations from addressing taboo or controversial subjects. 
Clark et al. suggest that advocacy is most effective when undertaken through
coalitions, networks and when linked with social movements. Advocacy for policy
change is often disconnected from longer-term efforts of social and economic
transformation because ‘efforts to influence policies should be more closely 
connected to social change movements’ (2002: 7). Yet Law 84 also prohibits
NGOs from joining or participating in international or regional networks without
prior permission. Social change movements also have their own context-specific
particularities. The only movement with a populist base is the Muslim
Brotherhood, a religious movement with political party goals. Kefaya (Enough) is a
political movement aimed at putting an end to Mubarak’s presidency and the 
inheritance of power to his son, Gamal Mubarak. While various groups have
emerged in the past five years with various political and social reform agendas
(freedom of the press, making streets for Egyptians safe, fighting religious 
sectarianism), none of them could claim to have a broad following to allow it to
claim to be a ‘social change movement’. 
2.3 Visible and invisible policy engagements
Much of the literature on advocacy acknowledges the possibilities of confron-
tational as well as more soft, subtle, informal means of eliciting change in policy
and practice. Yet the assumption underlying strategies of engagement are that
they occur in relatively open space. In many authoritarian contexts, the space
possible for engaging in policy contestation is not only influenced by the formal
channels of influence (parliament, press etc.) but also by ‘invisible’ actors who
play a crucial role in the overall governance of the country as well as the day-to-
day practices of NGOs and other civil society organisations. In Egypt, the State
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Security Investigations (SSI) Apparatus, the domestic intelligence agency affiliated
to the Ministry of Interior, plays an intense yet unpredictable role in governing civil
society. The SSI determines the very existence of NGOs, having the authority
(unwritten) to prevent the establishment of an NGO, order its closure, determine
the kind of activities it is allowed to engage in, and who it can associate with.
While officially, these are matters to be regulated by the Ministry of Social
Solidarity in its application of the NGO Law, in effect it is the SSI who exercises
this power. For example, the New Woman Foundation was an NGO that was
active in feminist advocacy since the 1980s. Previously known as the New
Woman Center and registered as a non-profit civil company, it was forced to apply
for registration in accordance with Law 84. It received a letter from the then
Ministry of Social Affairs stating that its application was rejected on security
grounds, without giving any explanation of what these were. The New Woman
Foundation took the matter to court, and won the case. However in the interim
period, it was closed for many months and its status was in limbo, forcing a 
rupture in its communication with its stakeholders. Moreover, the court decision
was not implemented immediately by the executive body. 
While the NGO Law stipulates that court arbitration can be sought when an NGO
is denied registration or unduly closed, other situations and incidences do not give
the NGO the space or right to do so, denying them any opportunity to contest the
state security apparatus. For example, NGOs holding public seminars, meetings
or any kind of public event must give prior notification and obtain permission from
the state security apparatus. While this is not inscribed in the NGO law, it has
become common practice through the government’s haphazard application of the
Emergency Law. There are multiple ways in which the state security apparatus
can prevent advocacy activities from taking place. Here, only one is mentioned,
namely, the ‘regulation’ of public outreach events. In some cases, it is the 
premises upon which an event is taking place. For example, with respect to one
association which was established by pro-secularist activists, some of its 
members wished to hold a one day conference to raise awareness among the
public (and the media) about the need for the reform of institutional policies and
internal governance of the Coptic Orthodox Church in Egypt (The Coptic Orthodox
Church is one of the oldest churches following the Eastern Christian traditions in
the world and represents the largest denominational Christian minority in Egypt
and one of the largest in the Middle East). The state security apparatus refused to
allow the organisers to hold the event in a large hall, and they were forced to find
a less appropriate venue, thereby influencing their potential for outreach. 
Since the state security apparatus acts as a ‘shadow’ system of governance, it
becomes almost impossible to contest their power. When dealing with a 
government, there are some visible institutions and individuals and some kind of
rough guide to the division of powers and where the policies are made and taken.
However, when engaging with the state security apparatus, no such knowledge of
their structure, their personnel or the decision-making process exists. In effect, it
means that NGOs are dealing with an invisible structure that is only accountable
to the President personally and whose real scope of power cannot be deciphered
or predicted. The scope of state security apparatus involvement in NGOs’
activities varies depending on the political moment, the actors, the cause and the
likely ripples it may have in the wider context. There is no checklist for ways of
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dealing with the state security apparatus or of predicting how they will respond.
Other than the national variance, there are all of the above factors (and many
more unknown ones) that come into play. While this has not intimidated citizens
into abandoning all forms of political contestation nonetheless, the state security’s
willingness to use the most ruthless of tactics to thwart dissidence as well as more
subtle forms of surveillance has often gone beyond expectations and predictions. 
Since the state is not a monolithic entity, donors who fund advocacy in Egypt must
liaise with different parties in securing support for their work, and as will be shown
in the section below, liaising with one government body does not ensure the 
cooperation of all others. 
3 Funding government-friendly 
advocacy
This section describes the largest ever funding initiative dedicated to promoting
advocacy among NGOs in Egypt to this date, it shows how the implementers of
the programme willingly and voluntarily reworked what advocacy means, the
mechanisms for funding, and the selection of beneficiaries in order to mollify the
Ministry of Social Affairs, despite a political agreement signed by the Egyptian
government conceding its consensus to the initiative. This is significant in that the
implementing agency was not given signals from USAID that bilateral relations are
at stake and there was a need to negotiate the terms of its engagement with the
authorities, rather, it took the initiative of reworking the programme in order to 
minimise the potential for any possible conflict to emerge.
The funding of Egypt’s (and possibly the entire Middle East’s to this date) largest
advocacy initiative by USAID shows how all actors involved– donors, 
implementers, recipients – purport commitment to advocacy, while re-inventing its
meaning to something that is in line with their own political agendas. In 1999, the
Egyptian government via the Ministry of International Cooperation signed an
agreement with USAID for the establishment of the NGO Service Center. The
NGO Service Centre was implemented through a Prime Implementing Entity (PIE)
comprising Save the Children USA (as the Prime Contractor), America’s
Development Foundation (ADF) and Infonex (all three American organisations).
The funding allocated for the six year project was initially set at $35 million but
was later extended to reach almost $40 million ($39,085.576) (Midterm
Evaluation, 14 August 2003, 1). The funding for the NGO Service Center was
pooled from the USAID’s Governance and Democracy Program. The Centre’s
objective was changed from ‘increased civil society organization participation in
public decision making’ (ibid. 21). Significantly, only briefly after its inauguration,
its mission was changed to ‘capacity of civil society organizations improved to 
participate in development’. Another important change was that civil society 
organisations targeted/ allowed to participate were reduced to NGOs. The
replacement of the term civil society organisations with non-governmental 
organisations represented a narrowing of the kind of organisations that could 
collaborate. According to Egyptian law, non-governmental organisations are those
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that are registered with the Ministry of Social Solidarity. Hence the change meant
the exclusion of human rights organisations that were registered as civil 
companies. The change also meant in effect that other types of CSOs such as
mosques, churches, trade unions and youth centres (all subject to different 
government authorities other than the Ministry of Social Solidarity) were excluded.
It is ironic that a multi-million dollar centre is established to promote advocacy
while excluding all those who have engaged in advocacy locally or whose very
mandate is to do so. 
With respect to the change in the objective of the NGO Service Centre – namely,
from increased public decision making to development, it meant in effect once
again a depoliticisation of the nature of the work. It meant a reformulation of the
whole ethos of the Centre – from one that will equip NGOs to play a new role in
Egyptian public life, namely, advocacy, which involves concerted effort to change
the policymaking arena to one which involves their participation in development,
which in the Egyptian context had inferences of any community-based initiative
that meets people’s needs and is sustainable. Business could go on as usual
without any contestation of government decisions, policies, laws, since this is how
much of development was conventionally practiced. 
The change in the NGO Service Centre’s objective meant that they were no
longer fulfilling the USAID Strategic Objective no 3 which entails ‘Increased
Citizen Participation in Public Decision-Making’. This is important, because the
NGO Service Centre was supposed to be the only USAID initiative on the ground
that would be addressing this objective. The NGO Service Centre was expected
under the new objective to fulfill instead strategic objective 21: ‘Egyptian Initiatives
in Governance and Participation Strengthened’. The mid-term evaluation of the
Centre suggested that such a change in the strategic objective of the Centre was
intended to bring the democracy and governance objectives ‘more in harmony
with Egyptian political reality’ (USAID Mid-term evaluation of the NGO Service
Center 2003: 21). They did not see this change as suggesting a radical departure
from the original objective of the Centre, and argued that ‘the intent of SO3 and its
respective IR3, participation in decision-making, would be perceived by the
Egyptian government as an overly intrusive role for a donor to play’ (ibid. 21).
As clearly stated by the USAID evaluation, the significant alteration in the 
objective of the NGO Service Centre occurred in order to avoid the possibility of
antagonising the government. The funding of the NGO Service Centre was 
symptomatic of the wider problem of donor funding politics in the Middle East:
pouring in significant funds under appealing labels such as advocacy and citizen
participation, while diluting its practical content of any potential to engage in 
contentious politics, thereby giving the semblance of democracy promotion, 
without risking its implications for foreign policy relations. Under the auspices of
the NGO Service Centre, hundreds of workshops on the merits of advocacy, the
difference between advocacy and development and the methods and tools of
doing advocacy were held. Manuals were produced, and appropriate literature
published. Yet since the focus was on providing tools rather than contesting policy,
the impact on NGO activism very much reflected that. According to USAID’s own
evaluation, the NGO engagement with advocacy can hardly be associated with
policy change. When one chairwoman of an NGO based in Alexandria was asked
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about her organisation’s involvement in advocacy, she ‘touted her organization’s
impressive achievements in the field of advocacy by pointing to their success in
marketing mushrooms, which was one of the NGO’s projects’ (USAID Mid-term
evaluation of the NGO Service Center 2003: 15). Although this change of focus
for the Center was identified earlier on in the mid-term evaluation, it continued to
characterise its future.
The very organisational hierarchy of the NGO Service Centre made it logistically
impossible for this donor-funded agency to support NGOs genuinely interested in
advocacy. When the NGO Service Centre was established, two committees were
established with the aim of assisting the Centre’s activity. The first committee was
the NGO Advisory Board comprised of 10 representatives of Egyptian NGOs and
which meets regularly with the Centre to monitor its activities. More importantly, is
the second committee, the steering committee, chaired by the Minister of Social
Affairs and comprised of other governmental officials, two NGO officials, and a
member of USAID. According to a former senior employee who worked for the
NGO Service Centre, the Minister of Social Affairs had the final say on who is
given funding and who not. According to the source, the Minister exercised this
power in preventing certain NGOs from being given grants, despite having been
approved by the NGO Service Centre and having met their rigorous criteria for 
eligibility etc. No higher level interventions on the part of USAID were made to
limit the Ministry’s control over the NGO Service Centre, possibly for political 
reasons. Despite going to great lengths to appease the government, this was not
quite enough to win over all the different actors that play a role in the governance
of the country. One former senior officer at the NGO Service Center recalled that
at the same time that the Minister was in close engagement with them, the 
security office at the Ministry (read: State Security Investigations apparatus unit at
the Ministry) had sent a letter to all NGOs warning them not to collaborate with the
NGO Service Center since it is a suspicious body. The NGO Service Center was
then forced to take several measures to affirm its legality before the NGO 
community. This raises questions as to whether even if a donor voluntarily
engages in government-friendly advocacy, will they still be able to influence the
political space and its demarcations?
4 Getting the funds and getting by:
depoliticising, diluting, and 
deflecting advocacy
Since advocacy has become popular in funding circles, (in Egypt, popular with
USAID, the US State Department under the MEPI initiative as well as by other
donors such as the EU), international and local non-governmental organisations
working under authoritarian regimes must find means of tapping into these funds
without incurring the wrath of the ruling regime. One way for them to do that is to
engage with advocacy as a buzzword, by transforming its meaning and essence
into something more palatable in the prevalent environment. One of the most
common strategies adopted by some development organisations is to use the
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word advocacy (fashionable, required by donors) as a buzzword to signify 
something else. For example, one of the two initiatives that MEPI (Middle East
Partnership Initiative) supported in Egypt under the rubric of ‘Empowering
Women’s Organisations’ was a programme implemented by Center for
Development and Population Activities (CEDPA) (an American NGO working in
the area of gender and population activities) in conjunction with the National
Council for Women to provide training for women’s organisations in four 
governorates. According to CEDPA, the project aims to ‘create and strengthen the
capacity of the networks to determine priority issues, develop action agendas, and
advocate for policy changes that favor women and girls, enhance the capacity of
the NCW to organize and manage advocacy trainings (for future networks and
monitor the activities of these networks’ [italics mine] (CEDPA 2005). 
There are some key points here of significance. First, the notion that this is a
grassroots initiative is deceptive. It is very difficult to make it a grassroots initiative
when the central agent for transformation identified in the project is the National
Council for Women, which was established by the will of the President and is
headed by the First Lady. It also raises questions as to the extent to which there
is a genuine mobilisation of women’s activists through the hierarchical nature of
the framework where members of the NCW are likely to yield power over 
representatives of local NGOs because of the close association between NCW
leaders and the ruling National Democratic Party. Second, by virtue of the central
role that the National Council for Women is to play, by default it excluded women’s
NGOs and other CSO actors that openly contest the government – or are
engaged in adversarial politics. It is unclear how NGOs were selected, and to
what extent were they participating on an equal par with CEDPA and the NCW
branches.
The dilution of the political meaning of advocacy can be inferred from CEDPA’s
account of their achievements. These include: appealing to the Undersecretary of
the Ministry of Health to provide medical personnel to conduct blood tests since
anaemia rates are high in Fayoum, and soliciting pharmaceutical companies to
donate iron folate supplementation for some months, and the purchase of medical
equipment for anaemia screening. Also on the list are: promoting change in 
community values vis-à-vis women’s political participation in Minya, and helping
women acquire voter cards prior to the presidential elections. Other initiatives on
the list of achievements include: soliciting the semi-governmental Social Fund for
Development to make a grant to be used for microcredit extension to poor women
in Fayoum and in Aswan, and generating funds for the production of a newsletter.
While some of the activities are relevant to women’s well-being such as fighting
anaemia, it is evident that none of the activities involved any change of policy.
Sending personnel for a one-off testing of anaemia is not changing the 
government’s policies on health (i.e. cost, availability, outreach). Similarly, having
a pharmaceutical company make a hand-out of anaemia related medicine does
not alter the company’s pricing policies vis-à-vis medication. It is more akin to a
charitable hand-out. Getting the Social Fund for Development to make a grant to
fund microcredit programmes and getting the funds to issue a newsletter are all
achievements that are best classified as successful fundraising activities. In this
sense, advocacy has become stripped of its political essence.
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Equally problematic, are activities that on the surface may appear directly relevant
to advocacy because they involve changing behaviours and attitudes, such as
change of community attitudes towards women’s political participation, but which
when analysed in their own political context, tell a very different story. The 
promotion of women’s political participation prior to the presidential elections of
2005 must be assessed in the light of the Egyptian government’s desperation to
have a high voter turnout in order to render to the international audience the 
semblance that the requisites for a democratic election are present, and hence
the results entailing the re-election of Mubarak are based on the will of the people.
Instead of engaging in changing policies that are detrimental to the rights of the
marginalised, they are actively supporting deepening the authoritarian regime’s
semblance of legitimate rule.
5 Disembedded advocacy
One of the recurring themes in the literature on people’s advocacy is the tensions
in adopting the expertise needed to engage in policy processes without losing the
ties of representation and participation of the constituency (Samuel 2002; Miller
1994; Covey 1994). In authoritarian contexts in which donors introduced advocacy
from above, many of the NGOs receiving funds to engage in advocacy are often
lacking a strong constituency on whose behalf they are making policy demands.
In some cases, a constituency is lacking altogether. The power relations between
NGOs and the communities in which they thrive speak of hierarchies of all sorts
(class, education, gender, religion etc). When the role of community members is
limited to being beneficiaries of NGO services, it becomes particularly problematic
to assume that they will become the leaders of an advocacy campaign. In such
contexts, development organisations wishing to engage in advocacy may find it
easier to evade the responsibility of having people-led advocacy or constituency
building and contend instead with having evidence-based advocacy. In the latter,
NGOs document the voice of the stakeholders and gather data about the issues
around which they are mobilising, as use it as evidence to validate the policy
change which they are advocating. Since the policy process itself is elitist in many
authoritarian contexts, allowing only a closed circle of policymakers and their
entourage any influence, participatory advocacy may not be seen as necessary
for successfully influencing policy.
The elitist nature of some NGOs also raises questions as to the extent to which
they are truly embedded in the socio-political context in which they work. The
absence of advocacy NGOs from any pivotal role in the workers’ strikes described
below shows how, sustained by external funding, they can afford to survive 
without engaging in the day-to-day struggles where advocacy was needed.
Moreover, the kind of advocacy funded by donors serves to perpetuate this 
further, by evaluating NGOs based on the measures they took to influence policy,
rather than how participatory the process was.
In spite of the high level of political repression, there have also been political
openings (albeit contained) which have been seized by different actors, 
unsupported by these advocacy NGOs. Public protests against the American 
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invasion of Iraq or against the Israeli bombing of Gaza saw thousands of citizens
taking to the street. While these were not protests against the government but
against a foreign power and hence were not seen as threatening to the regime’s
political stability, other protests took place recently that were directly against the
government. Between 2006–2008, Egypt witnessed some of the largest sustained
protests ever in the past 50 or 60 years. Many of these protests were initiated and
led by women, whose participation and defiance ‘shamed’ the men into becoming
involved. It was women workers in Mahalla who started the strike in December
2006 and who played a central role in mobilising and sustaining it – this was the
mother of all strikes that catalysed a series of strikes that crept across the whole
country like matches on fire. Women held sit-ins and ‘slept over in the factory
despite facing criticism for doing so’.
Hundreds of thousands of workers have taken part in one form of protest or sit-in
or another, across whole industrial towns (manufacturing and textiles) as well as
across different occupations (civil servants, railway workers, etc). The extent to
which they posed a threat to the government is open to deliberation. On the one
hand, the thousands of citizens out on the street or occupying factories and other
state-owned premises often brought whole areas to a standstill and there was
always the fear that their overt display of dissidence would trigger other forms of
public action against the government and eventually turn into violence. On the
other hand, these citizens were not openly contesting Mubarak’s regime or its
foundation or the projected inheritance by his son of the presidency, they were
protesting for bread and butter issues. Once agreements with the concerned
authorities were arrived at, workers went back to their daily routine.
Yet if these acts of political dissidence were to be analysed through the advocacy
lens, they are likely to be seen as relatively successful models of good 
campaigning. They were not all sporadic but highly organised, the level of 
mobilisation was so strong that conventional norms of appropriate gender roles
and behaviour were completely disregarded. For example, in December 2006
when bonuses promised by the government to textile workers in one of the 
country’s largest textile towns, Mahala el Kubra, were not delivered, according to
one account,
Some 3,000 women garment workers stormed into the main spinning and
weaving sheds and demanded that their male colleagues stop work. ‘Where
are the men? Here are the women!’ they chanted. Then 10,000 workers 
gathered in the factory courtyard and once again women were at the 
forefront. Strike leader Muhammad Attar later recalled, ‘The women almost
tore apart every representative from management who came to negotiate.’6
Strikes, demonstrations, protests were initiated by different worker groups, from
those working in housing taxation to the postal services, to industrial manu-
facturing and the list goes on. These events took place across the country, 
sometimes sporadically, sometimes organised, taking place after warnings of
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6 Socialist Review, January 2008, ‘Women were Braver than a Hundred Men’, Ann Alexander and Farah
Kubaissy.
7 Certainly there was a blatant defiance of the state security apparatus, which requires that citizens 
apply for permission to hold protests and demonstrations and receive approval from them (which is 
hardly ever given). Consequently, the state security apparatus did arrest some men and women, 
however, it would have been very difficult for them to arrest hundreds of thousands en masse.
8 For an excellent account of the wildcat strikes in China, see China Labour Bulletin, ‘Going it Alone, 
China’s Workers’ Movement 2007–2008’ www.clb.org.hk/en/files/share/File/research_reports/
workers_movement_07-08.pdf (accessed 18 August).
action were not conceded to. In almost all cases of massive strikes, protracted 
sit-ins in factories and protests, most of the approaches that advocacy experts
would claim their own were used. These include well-identified claims guiding
campaigns, massive mobilisation of a strong constituency as well as highly 
effective communications with the press. Other advocacy strategies and tools
were also used at length. There is evidence to suggest that the massive protests
and strikes led to the government inviting representatives to the negotiating table
in order to arrive at deals that would involve addressing the labourers’ demands in
return for an end to the contentious political opposition. In most cases too, the
protests and strikes ended once deals were reached and were only re-ignited
when authorities did not deliver on promised policies.7
However, while the workers were uncompromising in their critique of government
corruption, decadence and lack of accountability, what was being demanded was
not an overthrow of the political system or a change of government, rather, the
delivery of bonuses and salaries owed and which had been frozen for a long time.
Very much like the wildcat strikes in factories in China, demonstrations in Egypt
did not achieve wide-sweeping policy change, nor did they necessarily carry
through visions of political and social reform. Yet like their Chinese counterparts,
they achieved very concrete micro-level policy changes (in bonuses, salaries etc.)
which had a direct impact and bearing on their constituency.8
Significantly, advocacy NGOs, including feminist advocacy NGOs, were missing
from the scene of mobilisation and support for some of the largest advocacy 
campaigns to have attracted such numbers in half a century. True, the fact that
advocacy organisations were not visibly involved does not make a case against
supporting or funding development organisations’ engagement in advocacy or that
of human rights organisations. Yet there are some sobering lessons that provide
opportunities for reflection here: to what extent are women NGOs working on 
feminist issues in touch with the needs/conditions of the women who led these
movements? Are they advocating for issues that are enough to mobilise them into
action? To what extent is there a need for engagement in economic issues – the
bread and butter issues? The experience provides an opportunity to reflect on the
extent to which NGOs allow emerging grassroots agendas to shape their own, as
well as the extent to which donors have supported advocacy activities that run
parallel to, rather than in support of, social groups mobilisation for economic 
justice. 
Counter-arguments would point to the politically repressive environment in which
they work, as well as the difficulty in mobilising people around issues not touching
on their religious identity. On the political repression argument, advocacy NGOs or
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other NGOs who claim to work for social justice could not have been shielded
from political repression as were some of the protesting labourers. They did not
have the power of numbers. It is noteworthy that the only NGO to have played a
supportive role in the workers’ struggle, the Centre for Trade Union Services, was
almost immediately closed down afterwards. The Centre for Trade Union
Services, which provides workers with knowledge about their rights, legal aid and
documentation, was registered as a non-profit civil company because the state
security apparatus had rejected its application for registration as a non-
governmental organisation with the Ministry of Social Solidarity. The Ministry of
Social Solidarity closed down the Centre for over a year, accusing it of inciting the
demonstrations of December 2006 and of being involved in inciting workers to
participate in public protest. While a court ruled that the closure was in violation of
citizens’ right to freedom of association and ordered its re-opening, it was almost
a year after the closure that it eventually was able to open up again. Hence 
political repression in a context in which NGOs are not organised in large 
coalitions can be a sufficient deterrent for advocacy organisations.
With respect to mobilisational power, religious forces (Muslim and Christian) are
able to mobilise people en masse. It is in churches that priests have been able to
mobilise followers to protest and voice demands against religious discriminatory
practices against them as a religious minority. It is also in the mosques that
imams as well as political activists have been able to mobilise worshippers into
public action for issues associated with defending the faith, and support for
Muslims in other contexts. In recognition of their political mobilisational powers,
the government has put forward a new law to prohibit public demonstrations in
places of worship (mosques and churches). So in that sense advocacy 
organisations neither have the religious legitimacy nor work on religious issues
that are likely to strengthen their mobilisational powers vis-à-vis the wider 
populace.
On the other hand, there is still a strong case to be made about the disconnect
between NGOs and their ability to engage with bread and butter issues affecting
their immediate and wider communities. Some NGOs also show an aversion to
engaging in participatory forms of social action. Advocacy – stripped of its people
essence – can only serve to entrench NGO elitist practices further: why engage in
participatory forms of engagement when influencing the policy arena requires 
professional experts with the right kind of social and political capital? Where is the
incentive to think about downward accountability to a constituency? Donor 
evaluations assess the kind of attempts made to influence policy, not who is
behind them.
6 Advocating forwards?
Advocacy need not be adversarial, however, it needs to be political. In 
authoritarian regimes where any real political contestation of the ruling regime is
not tolerated, the political cost of such engagement for NGOs or other civil society
organisations could well be their very existence. NGOs have been for many
decades influenced by government policy of depoliticisation. When advocacy is
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exported by donors whose long term commitment to supporting civil society’s
engagement in democratisation is in question, the signals given to both 
authoritarian governments and local activists is not one to be taken very seriously.
For 50 years, the government endorsed a political culture in which NGOs’
principle role is framed to be apolitical service delivery. The expectation that the
thousands of NGOs would suddenly complement their charitable and development
activities with policy reform initiatives may be problematic. Moreover, when 
advocacy is considered one of the ways of donor’s strengthening of civil society,
and the latter is subject to the direction of the foreign policy pendulum, it is difficult
to gain much long term credibility. The case study of USAID funding of the NGO
Service Center in Egypt attests to the problems of supporting an essentially 
political initiative, without having the political commitment to do so.
Authoritarian contexts are sometimes characterised by the prevalence of a state
security apparatus that acts as a parallel state, whose policymaking process, 
personnel and rules are shrouded in secrecy. It is difficult for advocacy campaign
organisers to plan, design, and devise strategies against the state security 
apparatus when it acts as ‘an invisible power’. Yet donors funding civil society are
more likely to engage governments on the level of formal policies and institutions
rather than on the level of the state security apparatus.
Equally, many recipients of donor funding have also engaged with advocacy as a
buzzword. Instead of challenging the status quo, claimed ‘advocacy’ has served to
entrench existing political and social inequalities – MEPI’s funding of supporting
women’s political participation at a time when the ruling regime wanted to give the
impression that citizens were participating in the electoral process is a case in
point.
This is not to suggest that NGOs cannot play a contentious role, only that it is
often associated with government responsiveness to international incentives to
reform. In the case of Turkey, the Turkish government and people’s desire to 
qualify for membership in the EU, provided the political opportunity for feminist
activists to step up their campaign (IIkaracan 2007). In other contexts such as that
of Egypt, there is no parallel international ‘carrot’ which makes the position of the
government and the people more malleable to give precedence to universal
human rights arguments over ones premised on preservation of culture and 
tradition. However, no authoritarian regime is completely immune from 
international influence all the time under all circumstances. The Egyptian 
government will be susceptible to international influence at political moments
where its external image is especially important (i.e. at the wake of international
conferences and deliberation of aid packages). On the other hand, this will
momentarily open political space for activists but the activists’ legitimacy will
quickly be put to question if they are seen in the eyes of the public as strictly
pawns in the hands of Western players. This is especially since neither aid 
packages nor an international image are factors that necessarily make the public
more amenable to international influence. The dilemma of ‘working on both sides
of the equation’,9 namely how international efforts can press the government for
more political space for civil society, while strengthening local activists’ ability to
engage in its own campaigns against the government and its internal opponents,
is very relevant here.10
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Yet advocacy is not only about strengthening civil society’s engagement with the
government, but also about activists-people relations. In participatory advocacy, in
theory, there is no disconnect between the people affected by the issue on which
a campaign is being launched. The export of advocacy by donors to contexts with
deeply entrenched power hierarchies, and where the focus was on pressing for
policy reform meant that people were no longer central to the process of 
campaigning. A constituency was best consulted, at worst, non-existent altogether.
The impact was an elitist advocacy whose benefits can only be shared by an
exclusive few or a policy demand that has no legitimacy in the eyes of those on
whom it is launching the campaign. A series of factors have perpetuated the 
constituency crisis in advocacy. First, donor policies that evaluate advocacy based
on impact on policy change, rather than process as well. Second, the policy-
making process which requires elitist connections and networks in order to have
access to key influential figures. Third, the nature of power hierarchies 
characterising citizen-practitioner relations in the development arena and 
especially among human rights organisations. Political repression inhibited 
opportunities for building a constituency although its impact varies from one type
of CSO to another.
The need to contest and reform policies is as pertinent today as it was almost a
hundred years ago when Egyptian civil society organisations engaged in it without
calling it advocacy. The challenge is how to find channels and avenues for 
preventing its depoliticisation, its transformation into a set of tools, while 
simultaneously acknowledging that backdoor lobbying and negotiation may 
sometimes be more appropriate than public naming and shaming of officials and
other adversarial tactics. In Egypt, for the time being, the political moment of 
pursing any political, participatory form of advocacy has yet to emerge.
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9 A concept borrowed from Gaventa (2004). 
10 Although of course this is more problematic in reality because foreign donors will choose which 
causes merit support, and which are not seen as worthy of support because the actors or the ideology
do not conform to what they perceive as pro-democracy or progressive.
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